• The idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs. (United Nations 1987, Chapter 2.I.1.) Since the Brundtland definition has become paradigmatic for understandings of sustainability in a vast range of contexts, it provides a good place to start investigating the concept. One of the many problems with this definition, especially when lifted out of context (as it is so often), is that it is so vague and capacious that the concept it proposes is readily watered down and appropriated for a range of agendas. The World Bank's webpages on the topic, for example, revolve around the central claim that 'Sustainable development recognizes that growth must be both inclusive and environmentally sound to reduce poverty and build shared prosperity for today's population and to continue to meet the needs of future generations'(The World Bank 2014). This statement invokes Brundtland's rhetoric, and its first 'key concept', along with the 'three pillars' of interconnected economic, social and environmental factors.
But here, it is assumed that 'development' means economic growth (an emphasis which is also very prominent in the Brundtland report), whilst the World Bank's neoliberal agenda and its practice of imposing prescriptive loan conditions on borrowers in the 'developing world' are often very clearly incompatible with social and environmental sustainability. Furthermore, many green thinkers would argue that the very notion of 'growth' cannot be so easily balanced with environmental concerns (Dobson 2007, 53-62) . Meanwhile, in another appropriation of the Brundtland formula, the multinational supermarket giant Walmart® claims to be leading the way in sustainable business, declaring that 'our actions have the potential to save our customers money and help ensure a better world for generations to come', before outlining three 'sustainability goals' concerning energy, waste and 'products that sustain people and the environment' (Walmart® 2014) . 'Needs of the present' are here dubiously interpreted as 'sav [ing] our customers [in the West] money' (Walmart® 2014) . And the multiple rhetorical gestures towards responsible environmental policies and ethical labour practices ring resoundingly hollow when made by a corporation whose business model centrally involves exploiting the cheap labour of impoverished populations, shipping inconceivable quantities of ephemeral and inessential goods long distances, and selling them in huge out-of-town stores.
If ideas of sustainability can be so easily co-opted and moulded to suit such agendas, then this term cannot be used uncritically. A fundamental question to ask, as Andrew Dobson (2007, 29) indicates, is 'What is to be sustained?' For The World Bank, Walmart® and to a large extent the Brundtland Commission, the answer is predominantly economic growth rooted in our current system of late capitalism, but ostensibly at slightly lower cost to the environment than at present. 1 In mainstream versions of sustainability, as the Brundtland definition helps to demonstrate, 'the environment' is imagined as a sustaining background to human societies, as a storehouse to furnish the needs of present and future (human) generations, and a set of resources upon which technology and society might act to extend the 'limitations' of available reserves. A deeper green response to Dobson's fundamental question would offer a rather different perspective, emphasising the 'limits to growth', as the Club of 1 Relevant here is the notion that, as Slavoj Žižek is fond of saying,'it's much easier to imagine the end of all life on earth than a much more modest radical change in capitalism' (Taylor 2005) . This oft-cited formulation's origins are hard to trace; Žižek echoes Frederic Jameson's earlier and less specific remark, 'it's easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism '(2003, 76) . But since Jameson prefaces this with the words 'Someone once said '(2003, 76) , and doesn't specify who that someone was, it is difficult to trace the initial expression of the sentiment.
Rome's key thesis of 1974 put it. Such a position broadly argues that 'technology on its own cannot solve the limits to growth problem' and that what is needed in the sustainable society is 'profound changes in social thought and practice -changes in human values, ideas of morality and associated practices' (Dobson 2007, 57) . One of these shifts in thinking and practice involves a recognition 'that the environment has an intrinsic value in the sense that its value is not exhausted by being a means to human ends -and even if it cannot be made a means to human ends it still has value' (Dobson 2007, 15) . Whilst such a stance seems more ethically palatable than neoliberal versions of sustainability, I want to suggest that, whether of the 'shallow'
or the 'deep' (Naess 1973) variety, the discourse of sustainability nevertheless has a number of troubling theoretical blind spots.
The first of these is that sustainability discourse broadly tends to imagine 'the environment' as if it were a realm distinct from 'the human'. As Stacy Alaimo puts it in her contribution to a recent special issue of PMLA on the sustainable humanities, 'the epistemological stance of sustainability, as it is linked to systems management and technological fixes, presents a rather comforting, conventional sense that the problem is out there, distinct from one's self. Human agency and master plans will get things under control' (Alaimo 2012, 561) . This tendency to put 'the natural world' at a distance isn't confined to instrumentalist versions of sustainability. However hard deep ecology might try to critique human/nature binaries, the argument that nature has a 'independent' and 'intrinsic' value in-itself, and that 'human interference in the nonhuman world is excessive' (Naess and Sessions [1984] (Bennett 2010, 36) or, even more powerfully, 'intraaction' (Barad 2007, 33 ) of co-constituting entities and processes.
A second major problem with ideas of sustainability is that they rest on an assumption that there is a fairly stable ecological state, or 'balance of nature' to sustain, if only human societies could act more responsibly. In his essay in the aforementioned PMLA special issue on the sustainable humanities, Steve Mentz (2012, 586) points out that 'behind our shared cultural narratives of sustainability sits a fantasy about stasis, an imaginary world in which we can trust whatever happed yesterday will keep happening tomorrow'. This is a fantasy which the sciences of ecology simply don't support. From at least the 1970s onwards, this field has generally moved away from notions of equilibrium-seeking ecosystems towards disequilibrium models which posit that, as prominent proponent of this view Daniel Botkin (1990, 9) argues, 'change now appears to be intrinsic and natural at many scales of time and space in the biosphere'. Such an idea, he acknowledges, 'opens a Pandora's box of problems for environmentalists… once we have acknowledged that some kinds of change are good, how can we argue against any alteration of the environment?'(10). Botkin ends up putting a positive spin on this problem, proposing that humans should re-imagine ourselves as engineers or conductors who monitor and affect the speed of ecological change . This approach has its problems. Donald Worster (1994, 416) points out that it then becomes difficult to determine what is 'unnaturally rapid or novel under so restless a sky'. Furthermore, and perhaps even more importantly, the idea of humans of conductors of ecological processes falls once more into the hubristic trap of assuming that humans have the monopoly on agency.
Nevertheless, disequilibrium models of ecology do productively unsettle complacent notions of a 'balance of nature' which might be maintained through careful management or ethical adjustments. When even the White House is acknowledging huge changes in global and regional climate, and the radical uncertainties this entails, it is surely time to relinquish fantasies of ecological homeostasis.
That such radical and rapid changes in the biotic world as climate change are already underway and, as the IPCC report indicates, will continue even if radical action were to be taken now, also undercuts the optimistic teleological narrative of sustainability. A third difficulty with the sustainability narrative, then, is that it does indeed take the form of a certain kind of narrative, one in which changes made to our ways of thinking and living in the present, or the near future, will ensure a viable ecological, social and economic state of affairs for 'future generations'. That the 'sustainable society' is always yet-to-come, whilst multiple-dimensional ecological emergency is already happening -has already happened -ought to give pause for thought. Timothy Morton (2013,14) has argued recently that the contemporary moment is 'the time of hyperobjects', entities 'massively distributed in time and space relative to humans'(1) such as global climate change and forms of waste such as plutonium and polystyrene which have entered ecological systems but won't have degraded within an imaginable stretch of time. Hyperobjects outstrip our conceptual and imaginative powers; they evade our material and conceptual grasp, and their multiple, interacting effects are unpredictable. But they are nevertheless more real than the phenomena we can detect and imagine. Comforting and consoling ideas of 'sustainable' futures are profoundly undercut by the fact that hyperobjects are already here and now, materially affecting our reality. Thus these entities produce a strange temporality, not only in that they are 'massively distributed in time' in ways difficult to conceptually process, not only because they make the possible futures of life on earth so uncertain, but also because the hyperevent of ecological emergency will already have been happening and has already been happening in ways that haven't yet been adequately recognised.
I do not want to be misconstrued here as proposing the abandonment of practical measures that have any chance of minimising damaging impacts on wider ecologies within which humans are embedded. But I do believe that the real, present and unpredictable ecological emergencies of the contemporary moment require more supple modes of ecological imagining and ethical orientation than the habituated modes of thought that concepts of sustainability risk perpetuating. How might literary works play a part in exploring this dilemma? I shall now turn to some examples of contemporary modernist poetry to explore this question because I think that this mode of writing performs formal moves which might offer glimpses of alternatives to comfortable narratives of sustainability. Indeed, such writing positively cultivates and explores discomfort through techniques which unsettle the privileged stability of lyric or narrative personae, eschew teleological thinking, explore 'otherness' and reflectively engage the vocabularies through which the material world is habitually negotiated. This work also formally embodies principles of unpredictable dynamism, uncertainty and incompleteness. Such poetic strategies, as I shall show, have implications for ecological thinking.
Of mutability and trans-corporeality
The first writer whose work I wish to consider is Anglo-Irish poet Maggie O'Sullivan.
An acute sensitivity toward ecological relationships, and the ethical responsibility these entail, has always been a shaping force in her practice, and especially so since In both its troubling and its playful articulations, this poetry stretches towards models of encounter and ecological co-dependence for which we don't yet have Most of the individual words here can be looked up in a dictionary. An ashet is an archaic word from Scotland and Northern England for a large plate. To abraid is to awaken. Clyst is a Celtic word for river, and the name of a particular river in Devon.
A copple is a conical form, more specifically a hill. Bomba isn't a word that generally features in dictionaries, but a quick internet search suggests it is a proper name which could designate an Ecuadorian musical style, a village in Belize, a Libyan city or the for 'a word to make change', the term 'sustainability' might not be it.
Confidence in lack
As for O'Sullivan, ecological concerns have long been part of the context for Allen Fisher's notion of 'confidence in lack' offers a way in to thinking about his mode of engagement with scientific discourses. In an essay of this name, he asserts that 'poetry, when it is at its most efficacious, cannot propose logic, as it is variously perpetuated in paternal and public thinking, and cannot aspire to coherence, as this is also prescribed '(2007a, 77) . Poetry offers alternatives to public languages and in particular the imperatives of logic and coherence; its 'efficacy' lies not in provoking action but in opening up a space for glimpsing alternatives to knowledge understood in terms of rationality, consistency and certainty. In relation to this notion of 'confidence in lack', Fisher (82) writes
The trail leads into rudimentary understandings of quantum lack and the resulting confidence position, leads, as it does so, into the underlying topic of this paper which I first named, with a gobstopper in my mouth, truth, and second with a celebration of Keats' Negative Capability, 'when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.'
The allusions here are dense, and the prose slippery. But part of what Fisher is doing is placing together Keats' Negative Capability, which encapsulates poetic 'confidence in lack', with scientific ideas which posit a high degree of 'uncertainty, mystery, doubt'. (Indeed, throughout this essay he juxtaposes discussion of complex scientific ideas with statements about aesthetics.) The specific scientific connection, following Charles Olson's prior example (1970, 42) , is to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which asserts that at a quantum level, it's impossible to measure a particle's momentum and its position simultaneously. Knowledge about one of these aspects of the quantum particle is always inaccessible at any one time. What this indicates about
Fisher's poetics is not only that he embraces indeterminacy and a kind of felt knowledge as integral dimensions of aesthetic practice, but also that he sees poetry and science as parallel modes of enquiry -and as modes of knowing and investigating the world that talk to one another, albeit sometimes across great distances. Moreover, he sees both aesthetic and scientific practices as activities involving an acknowledgement of different kinds of uncertainty, incomplete knowledge, and even intrinsic contradiction or paradox.
To tease out the implications of 'confidence in lack' for ecological thinking, I
shall now turn to an example from the 2007 collection Leans, the last book in his long project Gravity as a Consequence of Shape, which spans twenty-three years. All the poems in the collection appropriate, to some extent, scientific vocabularies, and references to broadly ecological concerns surface with differing degrees of emphasis. In a reading given at Furzeacres in Devon, Fisher (2006) indicates that this poem relates to a particular place, Lake Winnipesaukee in New Hampshire, which he'd visited a couple of years before. Adjacent to the lake, he says, is a range of mountains, on the other side of which is an airfield which can't be seen from the lake edge. Even without this anecdotal frame, the first lines invoke such a scene, in which the 'reverse thrust' of a landing jet engine is heard 'across lake from/ behind mountain', but is experienced as 'indicative of a / storm'. The impending storm becomes an important element in a series of subject rhymes (a technique often used by Fisher) which draw together references to weather, climate, landscape and technological forces throughout. Here, the conflation of an incipient weather event and the 'reverse thrust' of a jet engine transform a 'natural phenomenon' into a natural-anthropogenic assemblage, which becomes linked through subject rhyme with references to climate change in subsequent stanzas.
The ominous, almost indefinable composite entity that haunts this poem resonates with Morton's notion of hyperobjects, (or indeed Bruno Latour's prior formulation of quasi-objects [Latour 1993, 55-59] ) which impinge, ambiguously, on everyday experience, but which defy full conceptualisation. In this first stanza, the emphasis is on sensory perception of the ambiguous 'storm'; it is 'heard', its 'edge' is 'felt on/ an arm' by means of a 'spot of rain' and it (complexly and indirectly) 'bring[s] squint / seen and then felt'. And yet these fleeting perceptual impressions don't add up to direct perception, nor secure knowledge of the entity. Morton (2013, 48) points out that, because of they are 'nonlocal', hyperobjects can never be directly experienced:
When you feel raindrops, you are experiencing climate, in some sense. In particular you are experiencing the climate change known as global warming.
But you are never directly experiencing global warming as such. Nowhere in the long list of catastrophic weather events… will you find global warming.
Fisher's poem explores just such a dilemma, its syntactical swerves and lexical ambiguities invoking the unsettlingly uncertain dynamics between perceptual experience and the complex assemblages that shape material reality on massive and minute scales in the anthropocene, but whose processes elude epistemological capture.
Thus this poem pursues 'confidence in lack' as a way of engaging such phenomena. It goes on to investigate some of the discourses through which knowledge about environmental change (and especially climactic change) circulates.
The lines 'hottest year / since measurement began' echoe oft-occurring formulations in the media during exceptional spells of weather, whilst another phrase 'Trapped in ice over thousands of years' (Fisher 2007b, 49) Fisher's collaging of 'found' and 'factured' language, his startling juxtapositions, disorienting syntactic swerves and compelling but ambiguous subject rhymes confront readers with the dazzling forms of complexity and interconnectivity of the daily emergency. Such 'creative linkage' constitutes the poem as a disorienting spatio-temporal structure, as its title might suggest; 'Spinor' is a term used in advanced maths and physics to denote a complex vector which produces (theoretical) spatio-temporal transformations. The poem thus embodies a form of dailiness in the 'age of the hyperobject' (Morton) in which one challenge is to 'process / uncertainties'(50) and unimaginable complexities. But far from inducing a sense of bewildered helplessness, Fisher's poems model a kind of linkage based not on straightforward causality but on speculative and uncertain inferred connections. This is 'confidence in lack' in which accepting contingency and a position of epistemological humility need not induce paralysis but instead suggests possibilities for incipient imaginaries formed through processes of discomfiting but 'creative linkage' (Sheppard 2005, 195) .
The poetry of O'Sullivan and Fisher courts discomfort, whether in terms of semantics and sensory perception, or ontological and epistemological uncertainty. In so doing, such work unsettles cosy, optimistic narratives of sustainability. Contemporary environmental imaginaries need to reach beyond such comfort zones. As Lynne Keller (2012, 583) has pointed out, 'through a focus on expanding the resources and pushing the limits of language itself', linguistically experimental poetry might 'generate the kind of intellectual and imaginative equipment that can help us move toward futures less bound to the modes of thinking and being that have produced the mess in which we find ourselves'. Some of these modes of thinking -the human/environment distinction, the failure to acknowledge non-human agency, notions of a 'balance of nature' and teleological narratives of predictable futures -are embedded in the concept of sustainability, especially in the 'shallow' forms adopted by corporations, powerful organisations and governments, but also in some of its 'deeper' incarnations. 'Lulled into false / expectation / run out of comfort' (Fisher 2007, 49) , the ecological emergency of the contemporary moment demands an unsettling of sustainability discourse as we currently know it.
